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OF TEMPLES AND TERRITORY:
THE ICJ'S PREAH VIHEAR DECISION AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
Sally Tyle r*
INTRODUCTION

Occupying a mere 4.6 kilometers on the frontier between
Thailand and Cambodia, the temple of Preah Vihear maintains
secondary importance in the pantheon of ancient Khmer architecture to
the more celebrated complex at Angkor. Even so, it has been the source
of tremendous conflict throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. This
conflict claimed the lives of both civilians and soldiers in 2011, and
forced the dislocation of tens of thousands of villagers.
Encompassing questions of cultural heritage and border
demarcation, Preah Vihear has grown as a symbol of identity and selfdirection within both Thailand and Cambodia. The 1962 International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") decision, which was meant to resolve the
territorial issue, instead created ambiguities that led to more conflict,
allowing political parties in both nations to manipulate the decision
toward their own ends. A subsequent 2013 ICJ interpretation has set the
stage for the parties to develop a process to cooperatively manage the
site and conflict surrounding it. The path taken by the two nations to
achieve long-term resolution of the Preah Vihear conflict may serve as
a bellwether for potential resolution of other regional conflicts within
Southeast Asia, and as a measure of the ICJ's effectiveness in cases of
transnational border conflict.
Section I of this paper examines the historical background of the
conflict, with particular exploration of the Franco-Siamese Treaty of
1904, the controversial Annex I map, and its subsequent interpretation
by both nations. Section II breaks down the 1962 ICJ decision, and
poses questions in light of legal and cultural analysis. Section III
133

recapitulates the ICJ's 2013 interpretation, clarifying the need for
dispute resolution beyond the court. Section IV explores the political
backdrop in both nations, particularly the recent volatility in Thailand,
without which an examination of the Preah Vihear controversy is
incomplete. Last, Section V theorizes potential paths toward resolution
for Thailand and Cambodia, as well as the role third parties could play
in any such resolution, and highlighting a maritime economic initiative,
which could serve as a model for future cooperation between the
nations.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The temple of Preah Vihear, a superb example of Khmer
architecture dating from the 11th Century, is composed of a series of
sanctuaries, dedicated to the Hindu god Shiva, linked by a system of
pavements and staircases over an 800-meter axis.' Though not as
extensive as the better known temple at Angkor, the temple at Preah
Vihear shares some common hallmarks of Khmer architecture,
including serving as a stylized representation of Mount Meru, the home
of the gods, and a depiction of the Churning of the Sea of Milk. 2
According to its designation by UNESCO as a World Heritage site, the
temple is "exceptional for the quality of its architecture, which is
adapted to the natural environment and the religious function of the
temple, as well as the exceptional quality of its carved stone
ornamentation." 3
In distinguishing the temple from the celebrated site at Siem
Reap, the International Commission on Monuments and Sites
(ICOMOS), the recommending body for World Heritage sites, found
that "Preah Vihear differs from Angkor by virtue of the way in which it
is inextricably linked with its landscape." 4 The temple is situated atop a
1,700 foot cliff in the Dangrek Mountains on the border between
* Sally Taylor is an attorney and policy analyst based in Washington, D.C.
She holds degrees fromEmory University, Harvard University's Kennedy School of
Government, and the David A. Clarke School of Law.
I TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR, http://whc.unesco.org/en/ist/1224 (last visited
Jan. 25, 2016).
2

THE OFFICE OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT

OF THE KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA, THE TEMPLE OF PREAH VIHEAR 99 (2010), available
at www.pressocngov.kh/beta/doc/PUB 05082010_ENG.pdf.
3 Temple of Preah Vihear, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI., AND CULTURAL

ORG. (2008), http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1224.
4
ICOMOS
Report
on
Preah
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2008/whcO8-32com-inf8BlADD2e.pdf
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Vihear,

Cambodia and Thailand, providing a panoramic view of the plains
below. Steep terrain and a gravel road make accessing Preah Vihear
difficult, but until recently, a dedicated highway brings visitors directly
to the temple from Thailand's Sisaket province and a comfortable
visitors' center at the base of the gorge opposite the temple had made
access from the Thai side much easier.
The temple was not always thought to lie on an interstate border,
and the story of how it came to receive that designation forms the basis
for conflict that has continued until this day. Throughout most of the
19th century, the Khmer territories, northeast of what is now Thailand,
existed in suzerainty with the Kingdom of Siam. 5 The Franco-Siamese
Crisis of 1893 changed that long-held order and created the boundaries
for the nations now called Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. 6
A sentinel event in the conflict occurred when the French
succeeded in sailing a gunboat past Siamese military strongholds up the
Chao Phraya River, where it docked within sight of the Grand Palace. 7
Though brief in duration, this event looms large in the collective
consciousness and national narrative of the Thai people, casting a long
shadow over Thai dealings with the French and French-influenced
nations, including Cambodia, regarding questions of territory.8 It has
formed the basis for a thread of irredentist foreign policy, which has
been woven throughout Thai political discourse for much of the 20th
century. 9
Thailand stands alone in the immediate region of Southeast Asia
as having never been a colony of a Western imperialist power, the
source of great pride for the Thai people. The nation, however,
recognized the superior military strength of the French at the time of the
Franco-Siamese Crisis and, in the face of the European nation's quest
to expand its empire into Indochina, ceded vast stretches of Khmer
territory to emissaries from Paris.
' DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD
ORDER: THE TOWER AND THE ARENA 558 (2008).
6

Shane Strate,Apile ofstones?Preah Vihear as a Thai symbol ofNational

Humiliation,21
Id.

SOUTH

E. ASIA RES. 41, 43 (2013).

' PeterCuasay, Borderson the Fantastic:Mimesis, Violence, and Landscape
at the Temple ofPreah Vihear, 32 MODERN ASIAN STUDIES 849, 851-52 (1998).
9 Id.; see also Strate, supranote 6 at 44 ("This discourse also created a setof
secondary assumptions that continue to influence historical writing on Thailand:

namely that Westerners are notto be trusted, that Siam's rulers were anticolonial and
that all regions within Siam (and some without) have always been considered
'Thai'.").
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When Siam began to re-negotiate aspects of the 1893 treaty with
France, the location of Preah Vihear first came into controversy. 10
Following a territory swap which included restoring the provinces of
Chantaburi and Trat to Siam, and ceding Sisophon, Siem Reap and
Battambang to French Indochina; the two parties agreed to create a joint
border commission which would establish formal geographic
delineation between the states.I'
Article I of the 1904 treaty established that the frontier between
the nations would follow the watershed of the Dangrek Mountains
between the basins on the Nam Sen and Mekong Rivers on one side and
the Nam Moun River on the other. 12 In following the watershed, the
treaty places PreahVihear in Siamese/Thai territory. Siamese officials
relied on the weight of the treaty as settling the boundary and placed
little emphasis on the actual mapping of the border. Western
cartography still represented a "new technology of space," to nonEuropeans 13; and Siamese officials had neither the ability to participate
in the surveying/mapping or to accurately interpret the results of the
French-produced maps. 14 Further, the Siamese did not even recognize
the need for this type of spatial demarcation, as they considered natural
geography' 5 to have clearly established the boundary.
In the clear view of historical hindsight, this lack of attention to
the mapping process carried significant consequences. Although Article
I of the treaty established the watershed as the reference point in
establishing an interstate border, Article III provided for a mapping of
the frontier by a Mixed Border Commission, composed of
representatives from both nations. 16 The Border Commission maps,
drawn by French Lt. Col. Bernard, as the Siamese took no official role;
Strate, supranote 6 at 47.
" Id.; see also Ronald Bruce St. John, Preah Vihear and the CambodiaThailandBorderland,IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin 64 (January 1994); U.S.
10

DEP'T OF STATE,

BOUNDARY
12

INT'L BOUNDARY STUDY

No. 40,

CAMBODIA -

Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment, T 6-7 (June

15,

1962),

http://www.ic

cij.org/docket/indexphp?sum=284&p l=3&p2=3&case=45&p3=5
I.C.J.).
13

THAILAND

4-5 (Nov. 1966).

(hereinafter

THONGCHAI WINICHAKUL, SIAM MAPPED:A HISTORY OF THE GEO-BODY

OF A NATION, P. 117 (1994).
14 Id. ("Since it was a new technology to the Siames e, however, the task of
mapping in those early days was undertaken mostly by foreigners, evenby those who
were not technicians.").

15 Id.
1

I.C.J., supra note 12 at 16.
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showed the border as running along the established Dangrek divide until
it reached the temple, at which point it veered into Siam, arching briefly
around the temple complex until its return to the watershed. The French
did not announce this curious carve-out of the temple site and, though
the Siamese had access to the finished maps, they did not publicly
acknowledge this discrepancy for decades. 17
At the time the maps were printed and published in 1907, the
Thai government officially thanked the French Minister and asked for
additional copies to distribute to provincial governors.' 8 The First
Border Commission had officially ceased to function before production
of the map was formally approved, so it is unclear what, if any, legal
weight the Siamese government gave to the map. Still, the Siamese
government did not publicly raise the issue of the new delimitation of
Preah Vihear to the French as an issue of contention at that time. 19
Additionally, a Second and Third Border Commission were formed to
address additional delimitation issues between the powers. PreahVihear
was not revisited as part of these processes, presumably because it had
been dealt with in a conclusive manner by the First Commission. 20 Nor
was the issue raised by Siam during additional Cambodian frontier
negotiations in 1925 and 1937.21 Finally, the issue was not raised before
the Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission in 1947.22
A 1930 visit to the temple by Prince Damrong, brother of then
first raised awareness within the Siamese
King Chulalongkorn,
government that the demarcation of the frontier could be in
controversy. 23 The prince, an amateur archeologist, led an expedition to
catalogue Khmer temples in the Northeast territories. 24 When the party
arrived at Preah Vihear, they were surprised to find a French
archeologist living in a hut and the French flag flying over the temple. 25
The prince did not make a public declaration of sovereignty to the
Frenchman, but he did consult with the British Legation upon his return

17
1
1

Galis, infra note 23 at 216.
I.C.J., supra note 12 at 24.
Id.I.C.J. supra note 12 at 24.

20 Id.
21

Id. at 27.

22

Id.

Allan Galis, UNESCO Documents andProcedure:The Need to Account
for PoliticalConflict When Designating World Heritage Sites, 38 GA. J. INT'L
ComP. L., 205, 216 (2009) (parenthetical describing content of pages cited).
24 I.C.J., supra note 11 at 30.
25 Strate, supra note 6
at 49.
&

23
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to Bangkok, inquiring whether the French show of colors was cause for
concern. 26
In his report, the British official noted:
I do not feel that the presence therein over a period of days
of a French archaeologist installed in a hut, even though
this be aggravated by his flying his national flag near at
hand, need necessarily constitute a claim by France to
possession of this territory. For the moment we can be
content to wait and see. 27
As Siam began to emerge into the modern era, domestic political
turmoil helped to redefine the way the public viewed the national
relationship to the Khmer territories. A 1932 military coup had
succeeded in bringing the People's Party (Khana Ratsadon) to power. 28
Luang Wichit, a People's Party minister responsible for much of the
party's propaganda, began to publicly refer to both the Lao and Khmer
territories ceded to the French in the 19th Century as "lost territories." 29
He also employed vivid rhetorical imagery about how those territories
had been amputated from the body of the nation. 30
Professor Shane Strate has argued that this new emphasis on
territorial losses during the previous century constituted an overt
attempt to crystallize discourse into, what he calls, one of National
Humiliation. 3 1 He argues that this rhetoric was used to bolster the coup
leaders' accusations that the monarchists had allowed both Britain and
France to treat Siam like a colony, even though it officially had
remained independent. 32
He writes: "Whereas Royalist-Nationalist historiography sought
to detract attention from the embarrassment of the monarchy/nation, this
new narrative on the 'lost territories' celebrated the image of
humiliation. 33 By doing so, the military regime hoped to transform the

Id.
Id. (citing NAT PO/8, British Legation, Bangkok, 'Siam-Indochina
frontier incident' (1930)).
28 .Strate, supra note
6 at 44.
26

27

29

LUANG VICHUTRVADAKARN, THAILAND'S CASE, (1941). Bangkok(souce

available via WorldCat -http://www.worldcatorg/title/thailands-case/oclc/8367328).
30 Strate, supra note 6 at 44.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33

Id.
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disgrace of the Bangkok elite in 1893 into a collective trauma that would
bond citizens to the new state." 34
It was this atmosphere that launched the party's irredentist
foreign policy and the beginnings of widespread public support to
reclaim the Khmer territories. As Siam officially became the nation of
Thailand in 1939, the party continued building support for what it called
the reunification of "monthon burapha" (the Khmer territories including
Preah Vihear). 35 This rhetorical war of words set the stage for
Thailand's invasion of Indochina in 1941.36
Though Thailand possessed the disputed territories throughout
the Second World War, France insisted, as a member of the UN Security
Council, that Thailand return the monthon burapha territories as a precondition for admittance to the United Nations. 37 The Washington
Accord of 1946 re-established the 1907 border once again. 3 8 Although
one can argue that the French government was most interested in
regaining Siem Reap, site of Angkor Wat, in order to establish cultural
hegemony in the region 39; the temple at Preah Vihear received little
attention in this transaction. 40 The settlement notwithstanding, however,
the Thai government continued to claim that its sovereignty over the
temple predated the war. 4 1
Cambodian independence from France in 1953 coincided with a
renewed emphasis on cultural heritage in Thailand, illustrated by the
beginning of the massive restoration of the ancient kingdom city of
Sukothai. 42 Thailand seized the opportunity to press its claim to Preah
Vihear, establishing a police post there and once again raising its flag
over the temple. 4 3
The Cambodian government objected to Thai occupation of the
temple and began to increase its use of nationalist rhetoric that mirrored
Id.
Strate, supra note 6 at 47.
Id. at 46.
3
MILTON E. OSBORNE, The FrenchPresence in Cochinindia and Cambodia:
RULE AND RESPONSE (1859-1905), page cited (1997); Strate, supra note 6 at 52.
3
Strate, supra note 6 at 52; U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 11 at 5.
34
3
36

39

Tim Winter,HeritageandNationalism:AnUnbreachableCouple?, INST.

Dec. 2012, at 1, 6.
Galis, supra note 23.
41 I.C.J. supra note 11 at 27.
42 Strate, supra note 6 at 52.
43 Id. at 52; see also I.C.J. supranote 11 at 31 ("Cambodia, on attaining her
independence in 1953, proposed, forherpart, to sendkeepers or guards totheTemple,
in the assertion or maintenance of her position. However, finding that Thai keepers
were already there, the Cambodian keepers withdrew. . ").
FOR CULTURE Soc'Y,
40
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,

the language previously used by the People's Party in Thailand. 4 4
Political slogans and cartoons depicted Thais as invaders and beholden
to America, while Sihanouk was pictured as the 'father of
independence." 45 Thus, recovery of Preah Vihear became an important
tenet in Sihanouk's nationalist political platform that would play out in
the coming decade. 46
A contentious series of bilateral negotiations followed, ending
in 1958, when Cambodia announced it would withdraw from the talks
and ask the ICJ to help settle the matter. 47 Though Thailand protested
that the controversy should be settled by bilateral negotiations, it
eventually joined to allow the case to be heard by the ICJ in The
Hague. 48
In 1962, the ICJ held that the temple belonged to Cambodia and
that Thai troops must withdraw from the undefined "vicinity." 49 Despite
responding angrily to the ruling, Thailand agreed to return the site. 50 In
a dramatic move designed to reinforce its contention that Thai
sovereignty over the area remained unscathed, the Thai flag was never
actually lowered over Preah Vihear, because the flagpole was literally
dug from the ground by Thai soldiers and moved to the opposite cliff51
where the flag remains flying to this day. 52
The temple was jeopardized by the incursion of the Vietnam
War into Cambodia in 1970.53 Ironically, the temple's panoramic

44 The People's Party (Khana Ratsadon), which came to power after a 1932
coup, accused the Siammonarchy ofallowing Britain and France to treat the sovereign
nation as a colony. Leaders of the People's Party pointed to Lao and Khmer regions
ceded to French as "lost territories" and decried the "amputation" of these territories
from the body of the nation. Similarly, the Cambodian government used political
slogans and cartoons vilifying Thailand for invading their land, being beholden to
America, and disrespecting Cambodia. Strate, supra note 6 at 52-53.
45 Id. at 53.
46 Id. at 52-54.
4' I.C.J. supra note 11 at 32.
48 "By its Judgment of26 May 1961, the Court rejected the first preliminary
objection of the Government of Thailand and found that it had jurisdiction to
adjudicate upon the dispute submitted to it on 6 October 1959 by the Application of
the Government of Cambodia." Id. at 8.
" I.C.J., supra note 11 at 37.
5o Strate, supra note 6 at 62-63.

" Kevin Ponniah, Preah Vihear Temple: Redrawing Jungle Lines, THE
DIPLOMAT (Apr. 19, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/preah-vihear-temple-

redrawing-jungle-lines.
52 Strate, supra note 6 at 64.
53 John J. Xenakis, Thailandvs CambodiaBorderClash DamagesAncient
Hindu Temple, BREITBART (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.breitbart.com/national
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location atop the cliff made it an ideal military location (the same fate
being endured today by culturally significant citadels in the Syrian Civil
War) 54.55 Lon Nol's loyalist soldiers held the temple as a military
vantage point from which they could easily observe encroachment by
opposing forces. 56 It was the site of frequent skirmishes with the Khmer
Rouge, to whom it finally fell in 1975.57 The Vietnamese attempted to
overthrow the Khmer Rouge by invasion in 1978, and fought a battle
with Khmer Rouge troops occupying the temple. 58 Guerilla warfare
continued to limit site access through the 1990's, and in 1998, the last
remnant of Khmer Rouge fighters surrendered to the Cambodian
government on site at the temple. 59
The beginning of the 21st century saw Cambodia attempting to
erase remaining colonial French cultural dominance over its antiquities
to establish a national mark on Khmer temples and monuments. 6 0 With
Angkor as its only World Heritage site on the UNESCO list, Cambodia
made a highly publicized announcement in 2007 that it would seek
World Heritage status for Preah Vlhear.61 When Thailand objected that
the two nations should jointly pursue the status, UNESCO agreed to
defer its decision until the following year. 62
In 2008, Thailand's Foreign Minister Noppadon signed a joint
declaration with Cambodia endorsing the measure to seek heritage

security/2011/02/18/thailand-vs-cambodia-border-clash-damages-ancient-hindutemple/.
5 Alissa Rubin,Amongthe Wounded in Syria's War: Ancient History, THE

(Mar.
7,
2014),
YORK
TIMES
NEW
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/world/middleeast/among-the-wounded-insyrias-war-ancient-history.html?_r=0.
" Xenakis, supra note 54.
56 id.

1" John D. Ciorciari, Thailandand Cambodia:The BattleforPreahVihear,
Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education (SPICE) Digest 1
TEMPLE,
http://www.preahPRASAT
PREAH
VIHEAR
(Fall
2009);
vihear.com/AboutPrasatPreahVihear.htm.

58

59

Id.
Ker Munthit, Last ofKhmer Rouge Surrenders,ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec.

5, 1998), [url].
60 ABOUT PREAH VIHEAR, http://preah-vihear.com/home/aboutpreahvihea'
(last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
61
Id.; Cambodia: Properties inscribed on World Heritage List,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/kh (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
62 ABOUT PREAH VIHEAR, supra
note 61.
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'

designation. 63 At that time, domestic political turmoil reigned supreme
on Bangkok's streets (see Section III) and public backlash was swift. 64
Renewed nationalist fervor over the temple helped force Noppadon to
resign for his role in what some characterized as the formal acceptance
of Cambodian sovereignty over Preah Vihear. 65 Though Thailand
officially withdrew its support from the world heritage application,
UNESCO granted status to the temple in 2008, listing Cambodia as the
site's national location and sponsor for status. 66
In October of 2008, a military clash broke out at the temple. 67 In
2009, both nations filed cross-claims that the other side had caused
damage to the site by firing on it. 68 The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations ("ASEAN"), led at that time by Indonesia, unsuccessfully tried
to mediate a settlement between the two nations, with Thailand again
insisting that the matter was best left to bilateral negotiations. 69
In February of 2011, a serious clash at Preah Vihear resulted in
significant casualties, with deaths on both sides. 70 A UNESCO
emergency mission to the temple determined that artillery bombardment
and gunfire had damaged the temple. 7

61

Seth Mydans, Thai-CambodianTemple StandoffContinues, N.Y. TIMES

(July
21,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/world/asia/21cambodia.html?

r-0.

2008),

See infra Section III.
Jonathan Head, Politicaltensions driving temple row, BBC NEWS (July
15, 2008, 14:16 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7507425.stm.
64

61

66 ABOuT PREAH VIHEAR, supra note 61.

Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the case
concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Summary, 2011
I.C.J. REP. p.5 (18 July).
68 Cambodia/Thailand Border Conflict around the Temple Preah Vihear,
67

INTERNATIONAL

COMMITTEE

OF

THE

RED

CROSS

(April

13,

2015),

https://www.icrc.org/casebook/doc/case-study/cambodia-thailand-border-conflictaround-the-temple-of-preah-vihear.htm.
69 Erlina Widyaningsih & Christopher B. Roberts, Indonesia in ASEA.Mediation, leadership, and extra-mural diplomacy, 13 NAT. SEC. COLLEGE ISSUE

BRIEF 105, 108 (2014).
7

Skirmish on Thai-Cambodiaborder, BBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2011),

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12463447.
71 UNESCO Press Statement, Director-Generalexpresses alarm over
escalationofviolence between Thailandand Cambodia,UNESCO MEDIA SERVICES

http://www.unesco.org/new/en/media-services/single5,
2011),
(Feb.
view/news/directorgeneral expresses alarm overescalation of violence-between

_thailand andcambodia/#.ViGl636rSCg; State of Conservation: Temple of Preah
Vihear, UNESCO (2011), http://whc.unesco.org/en/soc/311.
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After that skirmish, Cambodia appealed to the ICJ for expulsion
of Thai troops, and requested a clarification of the 1962 ruling. 72 The
ICJ issued an order for both countries to withdraw their military forces
while it re-examined the original decision. 73
In November of 2013, the ICJ reaffirmed the 1962 decision that
the temple belongs to Cambodia, but held that it was not necessary to
address whether the original judgment conclusively determined the
boundary between the two nations. 74 This decision sets the stage for
further dispute resolution; and while described as a win-win decision by
analysts on both sides, did not result in a truly satisfactory result for
either nation. 7
II. THE ICJ JUDGMENT OF 1962

In 1962, the International Court of Justice was still a relatively
young institution, and neither Cambodia nor Thailand had significant
experience in dealing with third party dispute resolution. 76 Their relative
discomfort on this stage, perhaps coupled with the thought that the ICJ
was dominated by the West, is reflected in the fact that, though both
countries had nationals in their full delegations, neither party was
represented by a national in arguing its case before the tribunal.
Thailand's primary advocate was Sir Frank Soskice from the U.K. and
Cambodia was represented by former U.S. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson. 7
Though Acheson insisted in later years that he acted only as a
private attorney in arguing the case, observers should not overlook the
fact that the United States government had a keen interest in shoring up
72

John D. Ciociari, Internationaldecision: RequestforInterpretationofthe

Judgment ofl 5 June 1962 in the Case concerning the Temple ofPreah Vihear

(Cambodiav. Thailand) (Cambodiav. Thailand), 188 Am. J. INT'L LAw 288, 291
(2014).
7 Id.
74 Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 1962 in the Case
ConcerningtheTemple ofPreah Vihear(Cambodiav. Thailand), 2013 I.C. J., 9 (Nov.
11).
* Greg Raymond, Thai-Cambodiarelationsone year after the ICJjudgment

11,
2014),
FORuM
(Nov.
[sic],
EAST
ASIA
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/ 11/1 1/thai-cambodia-realtions-one-year-afterICJ-judgement.
7 The International Court ofJustice (ICJ) began hearing claims in 1946,just
eighteen years before the Cambodia/Thailand dispute was decided. The Court,
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/indexphp?pl=1.

" Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, (Cambodia v. Thailand)
Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 45, p. 5
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its sphere of influence in the region; even as most Americans did not yet
know the role Indochina would play in their near futures. 7 8
Moreover, British interest in helping Thailand argue its case
seems a logical extension of the desire to counter French influence in
the region. Though it was probably not a primary motivating factor, it
is worthwhile to remember that it was the British legation, which
advised Thailand in 1930 to remain silent regarding delimitation
surrounding the temple by counseling them to wait and see. 7 9 With that
subtle bit of advice, the British may have unwittingly laid the legal
foundation for a holding that would go against its ally.
By a vote of nine to three, the ICJ found that the Temple of Preah
Vihear was located in territory under Cambodian sovereignty and
therefore Thailand was obligated to withdraw its military or police
"stationed by her at the Temple, or in its vicinity on Cambodian
territory." 8 0
In deciding for Cambodia, the court accepted that the 1904 treaty
established the watershed as the original boundary, but it also gave great
deference to the Annex I map and, most importantly, the actions (or
inactions) of the parties regarding the map. 8 1 Although the Court
concluded that, in its inception, the map had no binding character; it
nonetheless concluded that the parties' subsequent treatment of the map
established it as having established the frontier in the disputed area,
making it unnecessary to consider whether the line as mapped
corresponded to the watershed, as Thailand had requested. 82
The court's reasoning rested on the theory of acquiescence;
holding that since Siamese authorities did not react to the maps, they
must have accepted them as accurately establishing the frontier. 8 3 The
holding recites a litany of opportunities in which "it would have been
natural for Thailand to raise the matter," including the Franco-Siamese
Treaties of 1925 and 1937, as well as the 1947 Washington accord to
the Franco-Siamese Conciliation Commission. The court interpreted
"The support the US gave to Cambodia duringthe 1962 case leads many
Thais to still believe that global politics was responsible for the loss of the temple."
Greg Raymond, Dark History: the Thai- Cambodia Temple Conflict and Thailand's
Place in the World 10, April 2014 (unpublished paper presented at 12th International
Conference on Thai Studies) availableat sydney.edu.au/southeast-asia../raymondgreg.pdf
79 Supra note 27
80 I.C.J., supra note 12 at 37 (emphasis
added).
81 Id. at 31-33.
82 I.C.J., supra note 12
at 33.
83 Id. at 21.
78
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Thailand's silence as a "natural inference that she had accepted the
frontier at Preah Vihear as it was drawn on the map, irrespective of its
correspondence with the watershed line." 8 4

The court also gave particular weight to Prince Damrong's 1930
visit to the temple in which he was greeted by the French Resident for
the adjoining Cambodian province. Even though this visit was
characterized as unofficial, the court held Siam's "failure to react in any
way" as dispositive of acquiescence. 8 1
Thailand argued that the map had no binding character and that
watershed
line, as agreed to by treaty, placed the temple in
the
86
Thailand.
While contending that it had never accepted the map,
Thailand asserted that if it had done so, it did so only because of the
mistaken belief that the frontier reflected the watershed line. 8 7 While
acknowledging that the Siamese government "did not dispose of
adequate technical means" in the preparation or review of the maps, the
court nonetheless held Thailand accountable for any error in hindsight. 8 8
In holding that "if the Siamese authorities accepted the Annex I map
without investigation, they cannot now plead any error vitiating the
reality of their consent," the court nullified any argument of mistake. 89
Further, the court concluded that Thailand's acquiescence to the
map's delimitations, coupled with France and Cambodia's reliance on
that acceptance, had created an interpretation of the border dispute
settlement which "caused the map line to prevail over the relevant clause
of the Treaty." 90 As such, the court took no additional consideration of
questions concerning the watershed line and its prominence in the 1904
treaty. In effect, because Cambodia had relied on Thailand's
acquiescence and Thailand had derived benefits from that interpretation
in the form of border stability, the Thai government was now estopped
from raising the terms of the treaty as a defense. 9 1
The 1962 decision unambiguously held that the temple lay in
Cambodian territory, but the attendant instruction to Thailand to
withdraw its forces from the "vicinity," without further definition, set
the stage for decades of border skirmishes and gave rise to the 2011 call
84
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for reinterpretation. 92 Analysis of the original decision in view of both
legal and cultural principles properly informs examination of the
reinterpretation.
Despite the existence of acquiescence as a well-established legal
tenet, one can validly question whether the principle remains
ethnocentric in nature, and whether its application within the framework
of international dispute resolution is appropriate in all cultural contexts.
Silence may indicate many things in various cultures, and to interpret it
monolithically as an indication of acceptance may foment significant
misunderstanding.
Komolsevin has noted, "Asians in general, and Thais in
particular, use silence as an important communication tool." 9 3 She
posits that much misunderstanding within intercultural communication
is based on inadvertent ethnocentrism and a lack of awareness of Thai
communication culture. Understanding may be particularly lacking
regarding what she has called the "high context" nature of Thai
communications, typified as highly non-verbal and reinforcing
collective culture; in contrast to Western communication modes, which
are characterized as more verbal, with an emphasis on individual
objectives.94
In deconstructing the cultural relevance of silence in
communication between Asians and English speakers, it has been
observed that silence is often used as a form of passive resistance and
can be used to express dissatisfaction. 95 In addition, most Asian
societies hold in high regard the role of polite silence in fostering group

harmony. 96
The potential significance of polite silence in a diplomatic
context is heightened when the concept of "face," public self-image, is
considered. 9 7 "Social discretion through silence . . . involves
maintaining the positive face of the addressee through the speaker's
avoidance of disagreement with the addressee," according to Jones. 98
92 This is especially true given theproximity of the temple in relation to the
Cambodia/Thailand border.
93 Rosechongporn Komolsevin, Effective InterculturalCommunication:
Research Contributionsfrom Thailand, 20 J. AsIAN PAC. COMM. 90, 94 (2010).
94
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Cognizant that they would engage in continuous dealings with the
French, and then the Cambodians; it is possible that the Thais may have
valued maintaining harmonious group relations, and avoided
contributing to their counterparts losing face by not directly verbally
contradicting the assertion that the map reflected the true frontier.
One should note that as the only Southeast Asian nation to have
never been colonized, Thailand's independent status remained
precarious through the 19th century and into the 20th century. Unequal
power dynamics between the Siamese and the French obviously existed
in 1904, suggesting another reason that the Siamese, and later Thai,
governments might have wanted to keep their own counsel in dealing
with an acquisitive colonizer such as France.
The importance of non-verbal communication in Thai culture
underscores the adage that actions speak louder than words. Although
the ICJ majority made much of Thailand's inaction in directly denying
the map's accuracy, they placed no importance upon Thai actions
indicating reliance on the treaty to inform Thailand's stance regarding
its own sovereignty over the temple. Indication of such reliance in the
decades following the treaty includes Thai construction of roads to the
temple, and inclusion of the temple in an official Thai inventory of
ancient monuments conducted in 1930.99 Additionally, Thailand had
also maintained a continuous police
presence at the temple since World War II. 100 All of these actions
suggest that the Thai government assumed the temple to lie within its
territory, as it maintained to the court.
Further, it can be argued that the court minimized the importance
of the treaty as a deciding factor in the dispute. The ICJ's establishing
statute lists international conventions (treaties) as its first source of
law.101 Judge Quintana Moreno, one of the three dissenters to the 1962
ICJ decision, emphasized that the Treaty of Versailles established that
where a discrepancy exists between the text of a treaty and maps
regarding frontier delimitation, "it is the text and not the maps which is
final." 102
Additionally, by allowing the concepts of acquiescence and
estoppel to take precedence in its holding, the court essentially applied
* Winter, supranote 39.
1

101
102
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Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, ¶ 1.
Dissenting OpinionofJudge Moreno Quintana (Cambodia v. Thai.), 1962
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the contract principal of laches to an international border dispute, which
is highly unusual For either estoppel or laches to attach, however, it
must be shown that the party who delayed asserting the right (Thailand)
has benefitted and that the adverse party (Cambodia) has suffered harm.
In this instance, it is difficult to see how Thailand enjoyed a benefit from
any subsequent interpretation of the treaty, as it continued to assume the
costs to police and maintain the property. Similarly, demonstrating any
tangible detriment to Cambodia during the years when Thailand failed
to formally press its claim to the temple proves difficult.
The court also gives disproportionate emphasis on Prince
Damrong's 1930 visit to the temple as indication of Thai acceptance of
the map's accuracy. As brother of the reigning king, Damrong had no
official position in the government at that time. He was visiting the
temple in his capacity as an amateur archeologist, leading an expedition
to the remote territory. Reliance on his polite greeting of the French
resident at the temple as an official acknowledgement by the Siamese
government of the legitimacy of France's claims laid the foundation for
decades of confusion regarding Thai acceptance of the map.
The wisdom of an international court relying on maps drawn by
colonial authorities in an era decades later when both states have
independence is questionable, and harkens to the unfortunate principle
of uti possidetis in boundary resolution. 103 Gbenga Odentum has
suggested that reliance on incomplete border surveys conducted by
colonial authorities serves to "preserve ethnic incoherence and continue
the colonial objective of divide and rule."l 04 To do so, reinforces the
"eurocentricity of the applicable law." 0 5

"Utipossidetisis a general principle, which is logically connected with
the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. It's obvious
purpose is to prevent the independence and stability of new States being endangered
by fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the
withdrawal ofthe administering power... Its purpose, at thetime ofthe achievernent
ofindependence by the former Spanish colonies ofAmerica, was to scotch any designs
which non-American colonizing powers might have on regions which had been
assignedby the former metropolitan State to onedivisionor another, but which were
still uninhabited or unexplored." Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina
Faso/Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 ¶ 20 (Dec. 22, 1986).
103
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III. THE 2013 ICJ INTERPRETATION OF THE 1962
DECISION

The 1962 decision presents many avenues for further
exploration from legal, social and cultural standpoints; but the appellate
process is not one of those avenues, as ICJ decisions may not be
appealed. The court may, however, reinterpret its decision, pursuant to
Article 60 of the ICJ authorizing statute, which is what Cambodia
requested of the court in 2011, following the lethal skirmish with Thai
forces surrounding Preah Vihear.
Intervening decades saw both parties mature within the
international legal arena, evidenced by the choice of principal agents for
the 2013 case. Foreign Affairs Minister Hor Namhong was Cambodia's
principal agent, and Thailand was represented by Virachai Plasai, its
Ambassador to the Netherlands.1 06 One may speculate whether the
outcome of the original case would have been different had the nations
argued their own cases.
Notably, Thailand, demonstrating an apparent lack of faith in the
ICJ process, requested the court remove the case from the General List
of the Court in 2011, but the court rejected that request.
Cambodia's primary request to the court included clarification
of the Court's use of the terms "vicinity" and "territory" in the original
decision, and that the 1962 order "must be understood, with binding
force, that all of the disputed area that lies on the Cambodian side of the
line on the Annex I map - including, therefore, the Temple of Preah
Vihear itself - is to be regarded as falling under Cambodian
10 7
sovereignty."
Thailand's principal requests included a finding that no grounds
to grant a request for reinterpretation existed, or in the alternative, "that
the 1962 Judgment does not determine that the line on the Annex I map
is the boundary line between the Kingdom of Thailand and the Kingdom
of Cambodia." Thailand later amended its pleading to include that the
earlier judgment also does not "fix the limit of the vicinity of the
Temple."

08

10' Request forReinterpretation ofthe Judgment of 15 June 1962in the Case
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 2013, I.C. J., 151,
3-4.
107 I.C.J., supra note 106 at 8.
1os Id. at 11.
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The Court relied on many occurrences of conflict since the
original decision to establish that there existed a "dispute," within the
meaning of Article 60, which provided jurisdiction for acceding to
Cambodia's request to interpret that judgment.1 09
Thailand denied the existence of a dispute and maintained that
the language of the 1962 Judgment was clear and in need of no
interpretation. It asserted compliance with the original order by
withdrawing its forces to the area immediately surrounding the temple,
the so-called Thai Council of Ministers' line. It further asserted that
Cambodia accepted, by not protesting, that Thailand had implemented
the judgment by withdrawing to this line. 110 Cambodia acknowledged
that it made no protests.
The court found that Cambodia had expanded its definition of
its own sovereign territory with the maps it submitted during the World
Heritage designation process. Those maps indicated "the entire
promontory of Preah Vihear, as well as the hill of Phnom Trap
immediately to the west of the promontory, were within Cambodian
territory.""' Thailand had formally objected to the committee on the
basis of "Cambodia's nomination file . . . in particular, the delineation

of the indicative boundary line, the monumental zone and the
development zone" by asserting that the map attached to the file implied
"the exercise of Cambodian sovereignty in the area where countries
assert different claims on the boundary line." The World Heritage
Committee subsequently granted status on its list, excluding the
disputed territory by indicating "a revised graphic plan of the
property.""

2

Thailand contested what it called Cambodia's unilateral
understanding that the original ICJ Judgment determined a boundary
line between the nations, on the basis that the 1962 court ruled that it
did not have jurisdiction over the question of land boundary. Thailand
further asserted that, as the court had not defined the terms "vicinity"
and "territory," doing so fell to the affected nations; which Thailand
claimed it had done in establishing the Council of Ministers' line, to
which Cambodia had not formally objected for almost 50 years.1 13
Significantly, Cambodia argued that Thailand's obligation to
withdraw its forces should be understood as having a continuing
109
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character reflecting respect with the general principle of sovereignty.
While Thailand accepted the general obligation to respect Cambodia's
territorial sovereignty, it maintained that it discharged such an
obligation in withdrawing from the temple vicinity to the Council of
Ministers' line.
In a reversal of roles from the original court case, Thailand
maintained that Cambodia's practice in the intervening years indicated
acceptance of the Council of Ministers' line, while Cambodia now
asserted that "the practice of the Parties since 1962 has no relevance for
the interpretation of the 1962 Judgment."ll 4
Additionally, the court relied on Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, by holding that a judgment of the
Court "cannot be equated with a treaty ... the interpretation of which
may be affected by the subsequent conduct of those States."" 5 The
Vienna Convention was formulated in 1969, well after the original ICJ
decision, and that Thailand was one of three state parties to object to the
inclusion of subsequent practice as an objective tool for treaty
interpretation, as codified in Article 31, maintaining it is "never
conclusive."116
In the years since the Vienna Convention was introduced,
vigorous debate on the merit of using subsequent conduct as an
objective measurement has emerged in the international dispute
resolution community. Many voices on the issue have prompted reexamination in venues such as the World Trade Organization. In
particular, an arbitral panel in a case involving the Chile-Price Band
agreement required that subsequent practice must include "overt acts"
in order to carry significance, and held that silence itself could not
constitute subsequent practice.117 The panel effectively "dismissed
acquiescence, estoppel and implied agreement by silence as incapable
of establishing subsequent practice without more." 11 8
The 2013 Court did not appear to ponder any reconsiderations
of the use of subsequent practice in its re-interpretation, apparently
concluding that the issue had been definitively settled in the earlier
decision. The court further held that it need not consider the question of
Id. at T 60.
"1 IC.J., supra note 106 at ¶ 75.
"6 Alexander Feldman, Evolving Treaty Obligations:A Proposalfor
Analyzing Subsequent PracticeDerivedfrom WTO Dispute Settlement, 41 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 655, 669 (2009).
11 Id. at 686-87.
1s Id.
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whether the original decision had determined with binding force the
boundary between the two countries.
The Court centered its decision on the issues of Cambodian
sovereignty and how to define "vicinity." Using simple logic, the court
reiterated the holding of the 1962 decision that the temple is within
Cambodian sovereign territory and that it is located on an easily
identifiable geographical feature, a promontory. The court concluded
that "a natural understanding of the concept of the 'vicinity' of the
Temple would extend to the entirety of the Preah Vihear
promontory." 119 This definition gave Cambodia sovereignty over a
broader swath of territory than the immediate temple area, to which it
had been confined for almost fifty years by Thai policing of the Council
of Ministers' Line.
Conversely, the court rejected Cambodia's claim that the
concept of "vicinity" should stretch to the Phnom Trap hill, which
would have extended its territory by several kilometers. The court based
its denial on the fact that 1) Phnom Trap and the promontory are two
distinct geographical features, 2) the former Cambodian provincial
governor in the territory testified that he thought Preah Vihear was
within his domain but that Phnom Trap was in a different territory and
3) there was no evidence of Thai police or military presence in Phnom
Trap, and no previous indication that Phnom Trap held any relevance
for Cambodia. 120
In effect, the court's re-interpretation gave both parties some of
what they were seeking, but neither received the full complement of
which it had asked. As for future conduct, the court reminded the nations
that under Article 6 of the World Heritage convention, they must
cooperate between themselves and with the international community in
the protection of the temple site.121
IV. POLITICAL CONTEXT SURROUNDING THE DECISION

Any exploration of the Preah Vihear decision would be
incomplete without attention to the fractious political climate between
Thailand and Cambodia in recent decades and, particularly, the way in
which both countries have used the decision as a nationalist symbol to
advance domestic political movements.
119 Request for Reinterpretation ofthe Judgmentof 15 June 1962 in the Case
Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, supranote 106, ¶ 89.
120 Id. at ¶ 92-96.
121
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Relations between Cambodia and Thailand had been
characterized by ongoing tensions since Cambodia gained
independence in 1953. As the still-new sovereign nation erupted into
war in the 1970's, an even deeper schism formed with Thailand,
deriving from Thailand's support of U.S. policy in the region and
Cambodia's fervent opposition. Commentators have described foreign
policy stance at the time has been described as a "realpolitik view of
seeking to weaken a neighbor with which Thailand had substantial
policy differences." 1 2 2
The chilly d6tente between the nations warmed considerably in
2000 when Thaksin Shinawatra, a multimillionaire businessman with
close ties to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen, was elected prime
minister of Thailand.1 23 Closer relations with the neighboring state also
led to sharp criticism at home of Thaksin, for allegedly selling off
natural resources to Cambodian interests for his family's financial
gain.1 24 Charges of corruption against Thaksin eventually led to a
military coup that overthrew him in 2006.125 Though he fled the country
and has been living in various world capitols since then, Thaksin's role
in Thai politics remains enormous and has played a part in political
reaction to the recent ICJ interpretation.1 2 6
Political machinations on both sides characterized the decision
to seek World Heritage status for the temple. The horrors of the killing
fields cast long shadows over the international view of Cambodia, and
the Cambodian government used the UNESCO campaign as a way to
show rehabilitation of the country's global reputation to domestic
audiences. Significantly, UNESCO made its 2008 declaration during the
same month of the Cambodian national elections, and Hun Sen staged
massive, televised traditional Khmer performances and gala fireworks
shows in celebration. Cambodian media characterized the heritage
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decision as a direct result of Hun Sen's strong leadership. Popular
opinion reflected the sentiment that Hun Sen had protected Cambodian
sovereignty over the temple from the Thai aggressor, stoking nationalist
themes. 127
In Thailand, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and
the Democratic Party used the heritage campaign as a vehicle for
political gain. Though Thaksin had officially been deposed in 2006, he
had supported the People's Power Party (PPP) in its victorious elections
in 2007, and many observers saw the PPP administration as an unofficial
extension of his own. 128 Then Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama,
Thaksin's former attorney, signed the joint communique with Cambodia
to seek World Heritage status; and PAD leader Sondhi Limthongkul
helped marshal public outcry against the participatory action by
orchestrating anti-Thaksin protests. at the border crossing near the
temple.1 2 9 Soon after, the Thai Constitutional Court declared the
communique unconstitutional and Noppadon was forced to resign.1 3 0
Abhisit used the growing strain of nationalism as a key element
in his successful bid for Prime Minister in 2008. According to noted
Thai political scientist Thitinan Pongsudhirak, the PAD "exploited the
temple listing and turned it into a plank to derail a pro-Thaksin
government."131
In addition to facing criticism from the left regarding Preah
Vihear, the decision has been fodder for right wing groups with an
isolationist agenda, such as the Thai Patriotic Network. The group
mobilized one thousand supporters to march to the royal palace and
lodged a petition with the U.N. in advance of the 2013 ICJ interpretation
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claiming that the court had no jurisdiction over the temple. 132 "We are
taking action both domestically and internationally. Just like the Free
Thai Movement, which took dual action against the government during
World War II. We will use all means to force the government to
withdraw from the ICJ," said Chaiwat Sinsuwong, the group's leader. 133
In order to fully understand the debate surrounding the temple,
one must understand that such debate played out in the midst of the
increasingly unstable Thai political landscape. The years 2006-2010
were marked by massive public protests involving both the "red shirts"
(supporters of Thaksin from the impoverished, rural Northeast) and
"yellow shirts" (pro-democratic supporters, largely pro-royalists and
from the educated elite of Bangkok), which were variously responsible
for shutting down the international airport and burning a major
downtown shopping center. 134. The protests turned lethal in 2010, when
more than 90 individuals, primarily Red Shirts, were injured or killed in
a government crackdown. 13 5 Abhisit, who as prime minister allegedly
ordered the crackdown, was indicted on murder charges by the
subsequent pro-Thaksin government, led by Thaksin's sister
Yingluck.1 36
Political tensions between Thailand and Cambodia were further
heightened in 2009 when Hun Sen appointed Thaksin as his economic
advisor.1 37 The former prime minister remained beyond the reach of the
Thai criminal courts which had indicted him on charges of corruption,
yet seemed to be taunting his opponents from arm's length across the
border by giving "advice" to a political strongman widely distrusted by
the public in Thailand.
Backlash to Hun Sen's provocative appointment was swift, with
Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban threatening to close the
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Thai-Cambodian border.13 8 Subsequently, both sides increased their
military presence around the temple. This set the stage for the escalating
series of skirmishes culminating in several days of fighting in 2011,
which left troops on both side dead and displaced tens of thousands of
villagers. 139
Tensions between the countries subsided markedly later that
year when Yingluck Shinawatra, sister of the deposed Thaksin, was
elected as prime minister.1 4 0 Though the Cambodian government
welcomed her election as a chance to forge stronger relations, many in
her own country were not as sanguine, particularly leaders of the PAD,
because Yingluck's administration was widely seen as a mere place
holder for her fugitive brother.141 Her backing of a 2013 amnesty bill in
the national assembly that would have absolved charges against
politicians and allowed Thaksin to return to Thailand and openly retake
the political stage ultimately led to her political demise.1 42 The amnesty
bill was wildly unpopular with the public and it was withdrawn, but not
before PAD leaders had used it to help agitate against Yingluck.1 43
Suthep, who as deputy prime minister had threatened border
closure during heightened conflict over the temple, led public protests
against Yingluck beginning in 2013, amassing tens of thousands of
individuals on the streets of Bangkok, calling for her resignation. 144
Despite being forced to flee Bangkok for the protection of her homeland
in Northeast Thailand, Yingluck continued in her role as caretaker prime
minister throughout 2013 and into 2014. In response to the 2013 ICJ
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ruling, she said in a nationally televised press conference, "Thailand will
enter negotiations with Cambodia to put an end to the issue." 1 45
The stated intent to negotiate a solution with Cambodia was
sidelined by the electoral focus necessitated by the disruption to
democratic national elections in February, 2014. Suthep's forces were
successful in blocking election sites around the country, primarily in
Democratic strongholds of Bangkok and Southern Thailand. Though the
elections were re-held at the contested sites, the country's Supreme
Court invalidated all national election results on March 21, 2014.146 It
was widely thought that Yingluck would carry the results of any election
that were allowed to be tallied, and the opposition's refusal to allow
democratic elections to proceed laid the foundation for her ultimate
departure from the national stage. 147
Protests grew in strength into the spring of 2014, occasionally
bringing normal business operations in downtown Bangkok to a halt. 148
An order of the Constitutional Court forced Yingluck from office on
May 7, 2014.149 Having achieved the power vacuum that was a primary
goal of Suthep's People's Democratic Reform Council (PRDC),the way
was paved for the invocation of Articles III & IV of the 2007
constitution, which allow for the appointment of a new premier. 150 This
disruption also laid the foundation for an all-too-familiar
accompaniment to regime change in Thailand.

145

Peter Shadbolt, Thai villagers return after verdict on disputed Preah

Vihear
temple,
CNN
(Nov.
12,
2013,
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/12/world/asia/thailand-cambodia-temple/.
146 PoypitiAmatatham, Thai Court Voids Election, Adding to Turmoil, N.Y.
TIMES Mar. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/world/asia/court-voidsthailands-february-election-adding-to-politicalturmoil.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&smid-tw-nytimesworld; Andrew Marshall,
Insight: How Thaksin's Meddling Sparked a New Thai Crisis for PM Sister,
REUTERS,
(Jan.
30,
2014),
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBREA0U00620140131.
147

Thomas FullerIn Thailand Some Foreseea Coupby Legal Means,N.Y.

TIMES Mar. 31, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/world/asia/in-thailandsome-foresee-a-coup-by-legal-means.html.
148 Thai protests end in violence anddeath, AL JAZEERA (Feb. 19, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2014/02/thai-protests-turn-deadlybangkok-201421894749187900.html.
149

Thailandcourt ousts PM Yingluck Shinawatra,BBC NEWS (May 7,

2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27292633.
"o Thailandcourt ousts PM, supra note 149.

157

As has happened nineteen times in Thailand since 1932, military
leaders staged a coup on May 22, 2014.151 The current junta, headed by
Prayuth Chan-o-cha, calls itself the National Council for Peace and
Order (NCPO). At the time of the coup, Prayuth was a high-ranking
general. He was subsequently installed as Prime Minister, with the
King's approval, in the summer of 2014.152
The NCPO wasted no time in beginning to draft a new national
constitution, a typical hallmark of previous Thai coups. In contrast to
nations which view the constitution as a singular document granting
legal authority to the state, subject to change only through painstaking
procedural means, Thailand's modem leaders seem to regard its
constitution as a doctrinal football to be kicked around between politic al
factions, with the side in power remaking the entire document before a
flag is called on the play, beginning the cycle yet again.
The current drafting process includes many controversial
proposals. As with previous constitutions, the new charter would grant
amnesty to all military coup leaders. Though proponents have said the
measure is necessary to prevent incoming regimes from seeking
vengeance against coup leaders, critics maintain it virtually enshrines
the military coup as a predictable feature of Thai political life and
guarantees chronic instability in Thai governance.
Although early drafts of the new constitution called for direct
election of the Prime Minister and Senate, subsequent versions have
backed away from these democratic principles.153 It is widely
understood that the NCPO remains wary of direct election because of
the potential it affords Thaksin, still assumed capable of winning a
popular vote, to regain power. 154 The current proposal includes a
provision which would require election of only 77 of the total 200
senators (one from each province), with the remainder appointed by
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"former high-ranking state officials, such as military leaders" and
respected experts. 155
Another major focus of the NCPO has been implementation of
an anti-corruption commission, to which Prayuth appointed himself as
chair. 156 The commission's emphasis is largely seen as another attempt
to prevent Thaksin's re-entry to the national stage.1 57 The commission's
proposals include mechanisms to prosecute suspects without the
participation of public prosecutors, the absence of a statute of
limitations on public corruption charges, and as-yet-undefined
mechanisms to "prevent flawed persons from entering politics." 158
The NCPO has repeatedly maintained publicly it is only an
interim government, fostering stability until such time that democratic
elections can resume. Yet almost a year after the coup, Prayuth's
government shows no signs of relinquishing control.
On April 1, 2015, the NCPO revoked martial law, in effect since
the coup.1 5 9 International democratic leaders and observers were tepid
in their praise of the move, as the abolition of martial law lays the
foundation for Prayuth to impose Section 44 of the interim constitution,
which would effectively provide unlimited power to the NCPO. 160
Section 44 states, "Where the head of the NCPO is of the opinion that it
is necessary for the benefit of reforms in any field, or to strengthen
public unity and harmony, or for the prevention, disruption or
suppression of any act that undermines public peace and order or
national security, the monarchy, national economy or the administration
of State affairs, he is empowered to issue orders, suspend or act as
deemed necessary . . . Such actions are completely legal and
constitutionaL"l61
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In the months immediately following the coup, military
authorities temporarily detained thousands of Thai citizens by military
authority; most from the ranks of politicians, journalists, activists, and
academics.1 62 Those who have faced formal charges have been tried in
military courts, which lack the appeal rights present in Thai civil and
criminal courts.1 63 Though some who were detained have been
interrogated before their release about what junta leaders call anti-coup
activities, the majority of those detained may not have even been
interrogated, leading to public speculation that they were detained
purely for the symbolic value of demonstrating to Thai citizenry that the
NCPO has absolute power. 164
The experiences of a professor at Thammasat University, who
was detained in June of 2014, reinforced this thought. Along with other
professors who had stood for university office, he was told to report to
military headquarters, where authorities held him for four hours without
interrogation.1 65 Military police then released the professor and
apologized to him for any inconvenience. 166 He regards his detention as
the junta's attempt to send a message to internationally minded scholars
such as himself that the NCPO's power is controlling.1 67 He reports
having had no ill effects from the detention or any follow-up contact
from the military, but remains concerned about what may happen the
next time he seeks to participate in a scholarly or professional
conference abroad, as military authorities have confiscated other
colleagues' passports, and denied their travel requests. 168
On April 17, 2015, Prayuth issued Order No. 4/2015 of the
NCPO, as published in the Royal Gazette, to establish a working
committee whose function will be to cooperate with other national
agencies to seek advice from foreign experts about solutions to the
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political crisis and democratic transitions.1 6 9 The irony of creating a
committee to build international cover on democracy issues while
simultaneously invoking the ironclad grip of Section 44 must be
noted. 170
The palpable sense of dread among the Thai people regarding
the King's eventual death provides the backdrop for increasingly
frenetic maneuvering for power. With a reign that surpassed seventy
years in 2015, Bhumibol is the longest-serving monarch on the
planet.1 7 1 This has made him the personification of what it means to be
Thai for more than three generations of Thais.1 7 2 Throughout the rapid
societal changes of the late 20th and 21st Centuries, the King's presence
has remained constant. 1 73 The narrative surrounding him has always had
distinct religious overtones, almost mystical in proportion, and difficult
to translate to a Western audience. 174
Though Bhumibol has been in ill health and has made few
public appearances in recent years, he had previously been a force in
helping mediate between opposing political factions.1 75 Thai observers
frequently note his absence from that role in the past decade as a
contributing factor to the rapid political deterioration, which
characterized
relations
between
Thaksin/Abhisit/Yingluck/Suthep/Yellow
Shirts/Red Shirts.1 76 But
even though the King's presence has been less public in the past decade,
his persona holds an enormous sway throughout the nation, and it is with
a sense of impending doom that Thais will discuss the prospect of his
death (if at all) - both because of the enormous personal grief they
anticipate and the fear of potential political chaos that will ensue when
their nation's most stabilizing symbol is gone.1 77 As the Thai academic
who faced detention says, "We are all holding our breath, waiting for
the unknown." 17 8 And as the anxiety mounts regarding this pending
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loss, charges of violation under lese-majeste laws have grown, with the
NCPO frequently interpreting criticism of its actions as criticism of the
monarchy. 179
The unsettled Thai political landscape has affected Thai
relations with the United States. 8 0 Following a six-month delay, which
many Thai observers interpreted as a deliberate insult, Glyn Davies was
nominated on April 13, 2015, as the next U.S. ambassador to
18
Thailand.s
This delayed nomination comes on the heels of the United
States downgrading Thailand to the lowest level on the U.S. Trafficking
in Persons report, and the U.S. decision to indefinitely postpone the
planning for Cobra Gold 2016, a military exercise traditionally hosted
annually by the U.S. and Thailand.1 82 This seems an indication that the
Obama Administration's vaunted pivot to Asia may be floundering in
Thailand. The strategic collaboration between the two nations
envisioned by U.S.-policymakers as a wedge against growing Chinese
influence in the region has been largely sidetracked by the conflagration
of Thai domestic politics and the U.S. obligation, if it is to be respected
within the international community, to criticize the junta.1 83 Top brass
from Prayuth's government have met publicly with both Chinese and
Russian counterparts, and there has been speculation that China plans a
joint military drill with Thailand, to fill the void left by ambiguity
surrounding the future of U.S.-Thai cooperation.1 84 Presumably Davies,
former U.S. special envoy to North Korea, will turn his immediate
attention to the diplomatic tightrope act of maintaining the strategic
partnership with Thailand to prevent any further alliance with China,
while simultaneously rebuking the NCPO for its continued failure to
return the country to a democratically-elected government.' 8 5
Meanwhile in Cambodia, Hun Sen's Cambodian People's Party
lost 22 seats in the 2013 election.1 86 Though he remains the undisputed
strong man, Hun Sen's aura of invincibility is somewhat diminished.
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His son, Hun Manet, a West Point graduate, was given a visible
leadership role during the 2011 skirmishes at Preah Vihear. 187 That led
to speculation that Hun Sen was publicly elevating his son's role to
engender popular support for his presumed political heir, though it is
still unclear what effect this maneuver has had on the opinion of the
Cambodian people. 18 8
On April 9, 2015, the National Assembly voted to approve the
new National Election Commission, which is charged with overseeing
the next national election in 2018.189 Though the commission is equally
comprised of representatives from the Cambodian People's Party and
the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party, government critics
pointed to the strategically-timed release of political prisoners on April
10th as indication of a deal to weaken opposition party influence on the
commission. 190
To shore up the influence of his party post-election, Hun Sen
turned his attention to labor and economic development policy.
Economic balance is particularly salient in the case of Thailand and
Cambodia, where cheap labor demands have made the more developed
nation dependent on Cambodian immigrant workers, and the
remittances they send to their next-door homeland are a central support
to their domestic economy. 19 1 Thailand is second only to China as an
importer of Cambodian goods, and provides jobs for approximately
400,000 Cambodians. 1 9 2 This stasis was threatened in 2014, when
Prayuth made anti-immigrant remarks immediately following the coup
and publicly branded Cambodia as a haven for Thaksin supporters. 193
In fear of retaliation against them, as many as 200,000 Cambodian
immigrants fled Thailand in June 2014.194 The economic disruption to
both nations became immediately clear, and Prayuth quickly curtailed
his anti-immigrant rhetoric. 195 By tacitly allowing the workers to return,
1' Sebastian Strangio, Like Father, Like Son in Cambodia,ASIA TIMES (Mar.
17, 2011), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SoutheastAsia/MC17Ae02.htnl.
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the junta laid the foundation for the continued economic reliance on
low-wage Cambodian workers throughout the construction and lowskill manufacturing sectors.
Trade between the two nations had declined sharply under
Abhisit's leadership, due to reaction at the implied provocation inherent
in Hun Sen's reliance on Thaksin as an advisor.1 96 The political
pendulum swung the balance of trade the year after Yingluck was
elected, when trade between Thailand and Cambodia increased by a
meteoric sixty percent. 197 According to reports from the Thai Embassy
in Phnom Penh, this bilateral trade amounted to just over $3 billion in
2011.198 The more porous economic border may ultimately pave the
way for additional physical border crossing sites, as well as access to
Preah Vihear from both nations.
V.

THE WAY FORWARD: PROSPECTS FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

The 2013 ICJ interpretation contained a clear holding that the
Temple of Preah Vihear and the promontory on which it rests lie in
sovereign Cambodian territory. Regarding the immediately surrounding
territory, the court made an equally clear holding, which can be
summarized as instructions to the two parties to just work it out. But
how?
When the dispute became deadly in 2011, the parties turned to
ASEAN as an intermediary, pursuant to the organization's Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation, to which both nations are signatories.1 99 The
treaty allows parties to request that the Chairman provide good offices,
conciliation or mediation. The UN Security Council supported the
involvement of ASEAN, but some analysts observed that this was a
departure for the organization, as it .had not typically engaged in such
bilateral disputes.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa, then chair of
ASEAN, assembled a delegation which was to be afforded observer
status at the border. Included were attaches from Indonesia, Vietnam,
196
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China, Russia, Japan, France, and the United States. 200 Within one
month of the delegation's fact-finding visit to the border, Thailand was
again asserting its earlier stance that a third party would only further
complicate matters and that the dispute should be solved through
bilateral negotiation, refusing the presence of military observers. The
following month, Natalegawa cancelled a planned trip to both countries
and efforts of ASEAN intervention appeared to have stalled.
Noted Thai political scientist Thitinan Pongsudhirak predicted
that the role of mediator would "test ASEAN's mettle as a regional
organization." 201 If its brief public foray into the dispute and rapid
retreat are taken as the sole factors for evaluation, the ASEAN role in
resolution of the Preah Vihear conflict appears to have been an abject
failure. Perhaps, scrutiny on those terms alone would be to view conflict
from an ethnocentric lens, with demand for a clear winner and loser.
Thus, it may be prudent to examine the contrasting ASEAN principle of
conflict management to determine whether it can play a salient role in
an ultimate solution to this border conflict.
At ASEAN's founding, working guidelines were established to
deal with conflicts among member states. They include seeking
agreement and harmony, politeness, non-confrontation and agreeability,
the principle of quiet diplomacy and the principle of being nonlegalistic. 202 This gives rise to the vaunted ideal of non-intervention, as
the principle upon which the collective idea of ASEAN hangs.
Notably, most ASEAN principles on the topic of conflict refer
to conflict management, defined as "a broader term than such as conflict
resolution, conflict prevention and peace building." 203 The regional
organization thus views conflict management as a long-term process in
which "conflicts are not seen as simply negative, but are part of the
dynamics of the organization. If managed well, they can contribute to
the formulation of culture and norms within the organization." 204
Although the presence of ASEAN mediation has not yet help
solve conflict among member states Indonesia and Malaysia concerning
the land border in Kalimantan, the regional organization helped resolve
outstanding issues between Singapore and Malaysia over the island of
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Batu Puteh/Pedra Blanca. 205 As in the Preah Vihear controversy, this
case involved Singapore's use of a British colonial map to claim
territory, and was submitted to the ICJ for adjudication. Though the
court ruled in 2008 that the island belonged to Singapore, ASEAN
subsequently settled residual issues about use of the territory. When
ASEAN has succeeded in helping resolve tensions, it has addressed key
issues indirectly and in a non-confrontational manner, in what has been
described as the diplomacy of accommodation. 20 6
Though ASEAN's dispute resolution mechanisms remain
under-developed, a new emphasis on territorial dispute is emerging in
the region, and some leaders continue to look to the regional
organization to fulfill the role of mediator. Vietnamese Deputy Foreign
Minister Min Pham Quang Vinh suggested at the 24th ASEAN Summit
in 2014 that the regional block could help resolve territorial disputes by
adopting a "collective position" on territorial issues in general. 207
Thailand clearly had little faith in the ICJ as a vehicle for
achieving satisfaction in 2013, perhaps due to the sentiment that its case
was not fairly considered in 1962. Though the 2013 jurists appeared to
have carefully crafted a decision which could be publicly salvaged as a
win-win outcome for the parties; the fact remains that the court issued
an unappealable decision, holding that both the temple and promontory
are within Cambodian sovereign territory. By issuing such a verdict, the
court could strengthen the hand of those politicians who seek to prolong
the conflict via irredentist rhetoric, underscoring why the ICJ may not
have been an appropriate avenue for producing an outcome that both
nations could live with over time.
Further, analysis of the territorial interstate conflict finds that
one of the most important intangible factors as a cause of war includes
a nation's reputation. 208 Hensel-has suggested that if a state's loss of
territory to another state could encourage other adversaries, both
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external and internal, to press additional demands. 209 Thus, territorial
loss via a binding court decision might force the losing state into more
dramatic posturing to preserve its reputation. Facilitated solutions, on
the other hand, pose less risk to parties and may, perhaps, be more
durable; in contrast to the zero-sum game represented by
adjudication. 210 This suggests that further ICJ participation in the issue
would have marginal benefit at best, and could perhaps cause the
situation to deteriorate.
By continuing to regard the question of Preah Vihear as one
primarily of border demarcation, both states leave the issue vulnerable
to continued manipulation by political parties as a nationalist symbol.
Focus on the situation as one of cultural heritage may allow both nations
to articulate the temple complex as a source of shared heritage. It is an
issue of Khmer heritage, predating both the nations of Thailand and
Cambodia, with a legacy that courses in the blood of citizens on both
sides of the divide. Regarding the area as a source of shared cultural
heritage may help build the foundation for effective conflict
management, in which each nation would contribute resources to the
preservation and maintenance of this site of unparalleled historical,
archeological and cultural significance.
A site visit by the author in December, 2014, revealed the
frustrating reality of Preah Vihear, post-ICJ reinterpretation. Barbed
wire marks the border and a small platoon of Cambodian soldiers patrols
the temple complex, with apparently little to do as days stretch out in
uneventful homogeny, now that the conflict and political attention to the
area has subsided. Far fewer visitors come to the temple site now,
accessible only from the Cambodian side, as the Thai side has remained
closed since the 2013 ICJ decision. The area is remote, approximately
240 kilometers outside Siem Reap, and the two-lane highway ends well
before the temple site, with a dirt and gravel road forming the trek's last
notable segment. Only four-wheel drive cars with special permits are
allowed up the mountain to the temple site, but one can make the steep
ascent on back of a motorcycle by hiring a driver. Once at the base camp
populated by a small group of soldiers and those who provide
cooking/laundry services for them, a final hike up the mountain on foot
is required to reach the actual temple complex.
Visible artillery damage is limited, and the physical integrity of
Preah Vihear seems to have largely escaped the violence of 2011. The
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temple complex shows minor evidence of renovation, with wooden
scaffolding and temporary reinforcements visible in the first and second
gopuras (towers), but others of the celebrated five gopuras are little
more than a "pile of stones," as they were first described by the press in
1958 when challenging Thai escalation of efforts to reclaim the
temple. 2 1 1It seems clear that plans for preservation and site maintenance
promoted as part of the 2007 World Heritage application would surely
benefit from an infusion of Thai resources. Furthermore, whether large
scale preservation plans will ever come to fruition without it remains an
open question.
During the author's site visit, a Cambodian soldier offered
vantage through his telescope, which was trained on the Thai side of the
border several hundred feet away. Clearly visible was a Thai family
playing in the well-appointed visitors' center pavilion, constructed as
part of the Thai tourist sector investment prior to the World Heritage
designation and ensuing conflict. Just as the author was viewing the
visitors' center through the soldier's telescope, a young Thai child
peered back at the Cambodian side through a telescope there.
In an irony of major proportions, individuals can see to the other
side of the divide, yet cannot cross it to experience the ancient grandeur
of Preah Vihear. Escalation of political rhetoric throughout the years has
led to violent conflict and to the parties submitting themselves to a
forum (ICJ) that was ill-suited to generate a satisfactory outcome to the
parties. As a result, Cambodia has legal control of the area, yet seems to
lack the resources to pursue preservation envisioned by World Heritage
designation; while Thailand, with its well-developed cultural tourism
infrastructure, remains literally locked out of the site. In this regard, the
ICJ decision created a lose-lose outcome for both nations.
Indeed, much legal thinking about cultural heritage and property
disputes has been criticized for exhibiting a nationalist bias, which
defends the claims of source countries to total sovereignty over their
cultural heritage. 212 Others assert that cultural heritage is a fluid
concept, making absolute sovereignty claims arbitrary; and posit that
there should be a balance between sovereignty and shared access to a
common cultural heritage. 213
It may now be time for Thailand and Cambodia to look away
from the traditional framework of legal rules to explore other forms of
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dispute resolution. Ury posits that disputants have three primary options
in seeking resolution: 1) reconcile underlying interests, 2) determine
who is right, and/or 3) determine who is more powerful. He defines
interests as the motivations behind the parties' positions, and posits that
an interest-based approach to dispute resolution requires "probing for
deep-seated concerns, devising creative solutions, and making tradeoffs and concession where interests are opposed." 2 14 Further, the legal
regime of cultural property dispute resolution promotes a rights-based
discourse and creates the impetus for power-based approaches, which
may be ill suited to the question of Preah Vihear. By utilizing a rightsbased approach, via the ICJ, and a power-based approach, through the
aggression of 2011, the nations may have locked themselves into public
postures that prevented exploration of their true interests.
It has been asserted that cultural property disputes framed as
rights- or power-based are often unproductive and can damage
relationships. Ury has noted that disputing parties' satisfaction with
outcomes depends on the extent to which the resolution meets the
interests that originally led to the dispute. 2 15 He also asserts that greater
satisfaction with outcomes leads to better relationships between former
disputants and a lower likelihood that the dispute will recur. 2 16
Certainly, initial ICJ decision and its subsequent reinterpretation
damaged the relationship between Thailand and Cambodia. In repairing
that relationship and forging a sustainable solution to the Preah Vihear
question, an interest-based framework may produce a more satisfactory
outcome for both parties.
While Thailand has historically resisted, third-party intervention
regarding Preah Vihear, evolving attitudes there toward alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) may change this in the future. Over the past
decade, the acceptance of ADR has grown in Thailand, particularly in
the area of commercial arbitration, though mediation has also achieved
a foothold in community disputes. Court-annexed mediation has been
allowed in Thailand since the Civil Procedure Code of 1934 was
enacted, but its use has been inconsistent. 2 1 7 In 2004, Thailand
established an Office of Alternative Dispute Resolution within the
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Ministry of the Judiciary, which created mediation centers in courts
around the country. 218
Further, Sorawit Limparangsri, Judge of Office of the President
of the Supreme Court of Thailand, has suggested the creation of an
ASEAN panel of arbitrators, with the goal of circumventing the
"constraint of the oligopoly of elite arbitrators," so that parties will
become more comfortable with the process of arbitration. As a strong
proponent of ADR in alignment with Thai cultural values of peaceful
conflict resolution, he has noted, "When our economies grow so
speedily that we cannot keep pace, we sometimes forget this admirable
past and become entangled with advocating our positions and litigating
everything."219 Such thought may ultimately pave the way for Thai
acceptance of facilitated resolution of the Preah Vihear conflict.
The author conducted an interview with Sorawit, in Bangkok in
January, 2015, to discuss reaction to the ICJ decision among the Thai
public and to explore options for sustainable resolution. As an expert on
alternative dispute resolution, he has written and spoken widely on the
dynamics of regional dispute resolution within Southeast Asia.
Though he described public pushback and dismay regarding the
ICJ decision immediately following its announcement in the Fall of
2014, Sorawit says that the "dust may have settled," and that public
acceptance means the issue of Preah Vihear has retreated in the Thai
collective consciousness for the time being. 220 He warns, however, that
it is "still a potentially volatile situation," that political forces could
reignite to serve their own interests. 22 1
Noting that the Preah Vihear border sovereignty situation is a
"Khmer problem that pre-dates the colonial era," Sorawit warns that
historical entrenchment makes the situation less susceptible to facile
dispute resolution. 2 22 He points optimistically to the fact that his office
and the Court of Justice have trained more than 3,000 court-appointed
mediators as evidence of the fact that ADR is now well-recognized and
accepted in contemporary Thai society. 223 Its use has become
particularly widespread in domestic matters and in local government
disputes. 224
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Still, Sorawit thinks that formal dispute resolution mechanisms
would not be successful regarding Preah Vihear, at this point. 225
"Currently, the situation would be too difficult for a mediator to resolve.
We must first rebuild our relationship with Cambodia. There is too little
trust on either side now," he says. 226
Though the assistance through good offices of a third party
neutral nation is a concept widely discussed within ASEAN, Sorawit
views it as still a long way from realistic option in the region. He
emphasizes that intra-ASEAN relationships and attitudes would have a
significant impact on a nation's ability to be effective in such a role. 227
As an example, he says that Indonesian President Joko Widodo is too
recently elected to have forged the mature relationships with Thailand
and Cambodia necessary for either country to view his administration
as a trusted ally in resolving the Preah Vihear dispute. 228 Further, he
posits that Myanmar's reluctance to invite intervention in its own
politics makes it unlikely that the nation would extend itself in an
intervention with fellow ASEAN nations. Sorawit points to Malaysia as
the ASEAN country perhaps best equipped to fulfill a useful neutral
role, because it is widely viewed within the region as a stable, nonthreatening force. 229
Additionally, he sees the unifying cultural factors that define the
"ASEAN way" as both a strength and weakness in terms of potential for
intra-regional dispute resolution.230 Sorawit says that the nonconfrontational basis of these principles can help bring parties to the
table, but that if a country is out of compliance with a treaty or
agreement, there is "no mechanism for enforcement, no binding
process." 231 He says that a process which stresses harmony between
nations, yet also "has teeth" is needed.232
But while current political realities make diplomatic resolution
of the Preah Vihear dispute unlikely, Sorawit thinks that commercial
cooperation can help lay the foundation for future accord. 233 He points
to the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as an example of this type

225
226
227
228
229
230

Interview with Sorawit Limparangsri, supra note 220.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

231

Interview with Sorawit Limparangsri, supra note 220.

232

Id.
Id.

233

171

of cooperation. 234 The AEC blueprint was adopted at the 13th ASEAN
Summit in 2007, with a goal of regional economic integration by 2015.
AEC objectives include 1) a single market and production base, 2) a
highly competitive economic region, 3) a region of equitable economic
development, and 4) a region fully integrated into the global economy.
Sorawit says that by engaging more actively as strategic economic
partners, Thailand and Cambodia can forge the kind of relationship that
could make successful management of the Preah Vihear conflict a
reality. 235
Sorawit and other observers note that cooperative management
of joint commercial concerns between the two nations could ultimately
provide a successful model for resolution of the PreahVihear dispute. 236
In addition to the cooperative ideals encapsulated within the ASEAN
way, the region's high degree of economic interdependence makes a
strong case for settling the temple dispute without further conflict. 237
In fact, it is the management of a dispute with massive economic
implications which may have the most application for a solution to the
Preah Vihear question. Observers point to conflict over maritime
territory in the Gulf of Thailand as potentially setting the stage for a new
phase of dispute resolution/management between Thailand and
Cambodia. 238
The disputed area is known as the Overlapping Claims Area
(OCA), 27,000 square kilometers defined by the Cambodia claim of
1972 for its western boundary, the Thai claim of 1973 for its eastern
boundary, and the 1991 Cambodia-Vietnam maritime border as its
southern boundary. 239 This vast area of ocean is of particular interest
because of what lies underneath it: approximately eleven trillion cubic
feet of natural gas and an undetermined, thought to be enormous,
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amount of oil.240 According to a World Bank internal report, "The
reason for intense regional interest in the OCA is that many oil and gas
experts believe the area within the OCA is the most attractive
undeveloped oil and gas exploration area in all of Asia." 24 1
Both Cambodia and Thailand are signatories to the United
Nationals Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), though
Cambodia has not ratified. 242 Article 287 of the convention establishes
a range of forums for dispute settlement of disputes, including the ICJ,
a special maritime arbitral panel, and other options. 243
The maritime territorial dispute of the OCA stems from the same
1907 French-led mapping that spawned the Preah Vihear conflict, and
resulting cartographic discrepancies led Cambodia to draw its boundary
line across Kut Island, which is located within Thai territory. 244 Thus,
the same issues of national humiliation as in the Preah Vihear
controversy are potentially at stake in asking for the judgment or
interpretation of an international body, making it unlikely that the
parties would select one of the international forums articulated within
UNCLOS.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) setting forth a
framework for resolution of the OCA question was signed by the two
countries in 2001, but was rescinded by Thailand in 2009, at the height
of Abhisit's anti-Cambodian policies. 245 In the interim, both nations
have awarded conditional commercial exploration licenses to various
corporations; but exploitation of the area's vast energy resources cannot
commence until they reach some form of agreement on the issue of
revenue-sharing. The Cambodian scheme would divide the disputed
area into a checkerboard of fourteen contiguous blocks, with revenue
and management of the blocks shared on a 50/50 basic between the two
countries. 246 The Thai counterproposal calls for the area to be divided
into three larger strips running north-south, with the revenue from the
central strip shared equally; and revenue in the outlying areas flowing
primarily to the adjacent nation, calling for Thailand to gain eighty
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percent of the revenue on the Western side and Cambodia to accrue
eighty percent of the revenue on the Eastern side of the divide. 247
Geologists estimate that most of the exploitable reserves within
the OCA are located toward the Western (Thai) side of the divide with
geologic formations on the Eastern (Cambodian) side making
exploration more difficult, which has caused some critics to claim that
the Thai proposal unfairly slants revenue. 248 But the sophisticated nature
of the Thai oil and gas industries, relative to its Cambodian counterparts,
means that Thai companies and contractors will undoubtedly take on the
bulk of the work in the OCA, so even the Cambodian proposal for a 5050 revenue split would enrich Thailand because of the exploration
contracts they will be awarded.
Economic pressure is creating a sense of urgency that will likely
be successful in bringing both nations back to the table. Thailand's
maritime interests in the area are estimated at approximately $6 billion
a year and set to grow over the next decade. 249 And for Cambodia, the
goal of developing a more mature oil and gas industry that could
compete within the region would be helped immeasurably by launching
work in the area.
Both nations have signaled a new willingness to compromise
regarding the OCA, according to security sources. 250 High-level
delegations have made visits on both sides to discuss establishing a joint
committee on maritime delimitations. 2 5 1
An alternative approach to seeking resolution from an
international adjudicative body, with potential loss of sovereignty over
disputed territory, and the accompanying loss of face which flows from
it, however, is gaining momentum. Those familiar with the situation
claim that the concept of a Joint Development Area (JDA), prioritizing
conflict management over conflict resolution, is being seriously
considered by both sides, allowing the countries to begin work in the
area without either side having to formally relinquish territorial
claims. 252 Those claims could be discussed separately, or not at all.
One of the first JDAs was created by Thailand and Malaysia in
1991 to manage an area of overlapping continental shelf of
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approximately 7,250 kilometers in the Gulf of Thailand, near the South
China Sea, under the auspices of the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority
(MTJA). 253 The MTJA, governed by a board consisting of seven
nationals from each side, grants rights for exploration and production of
petroleum within the JDA in the form of a production-sharing
contract. 254 The JDA's motto is "Brothers drinking from the same
well"

2 55

By setting aside the thornier legal issues of demarcation likely
result
in a winner and a loser, and concentrating on mutual
to
exploitation of resources of great benefit to both countries, the
mechanism of a JDA could create the win-win scenario allowing both
Thailand and Cambodia to move forward. Further, once the countries
have established a framework for working on issues of mutual concern
within the OCA, it becomes more likely that they could address the
boundary issues through bilateral negotiations.
Thus, successful conflict management of the OCA could provide
a template for a similar approach in Preah Vihear. The absence of
massive revenue potential, in contrast to the OCA, means that the two
nations could freely embark on a JDA for the temple complex tailored
to their own needs, rather than desired corporate outcomes. Further,
successful joint management of the OCA would prove that both nations
have sufficient maturity to engage on their own behalf, without resorting
to international adjudication, a highly-valued principle within the
philosophical precepts of ASEAN.
Finally, UNESCO's role, both in exacerbating the conflict and
in potentially helping to resolve it, should be examined. Given the
explosive political climate illustrated in Section IV, a World Heritage
declaration in 2008 with Cambodia as the sole sponsor clearly had the
potential to heighten tensions between the two nations. UNESCO's
decision not to delay the declaration until after the conflict's resolution
seems to support the notion that the international community prioritize d
aiding Cambodia's massive public relations campaign to repair its
global image ahead of other considerations.
This distinction is particularly salient in light of the fact that
UNESCO postponed consideration of a declaration regarding
archeological sites in East Jerusalem in 2001 "until an agreement on the
status of the City of Jerusalem in conformity with International Law is
MALAYSIA-THAILAND
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reach or until the parties concerned (Israel and the League of Arab
States) submit a joint nomination." 2 56
Beyond making a public declaration of concern about violence
at Preah Vihear and sending an emissary to inspect damage at the
temple, UNESCO has taken no action regarding the conflict. It has been
suggested that an explicit mechanism to address political conflict should
be included in the operational guidelines of the World Heritage
Convention, and further, that a UNESCO arbitrational body be created
to resolve such conflicts. 257 Others have suggested that UNESCO
promulgate a non-binding standard-setting instrument for resolving
cultural property disputes, which would recommend member states to
pursue resolution first through collaborative law, then, failing that,
through mediation and then arbitration, before resorting to litigation. 258
Until such avenues are created, UNESCO cannot play an effective role
in resolving conflicts surrounding heritage sites, but in the interim, the
organization should at the very least be expected to exhibit prudence
and restraint in the selection of sites that carry a significant potential for
conflict.
CONCLUSION

The 2013 ICJ reinterpretation set clear parameters for issues of
sovereign territory at Preah Vihear, but equally clearly puts the
responsibility for resolving future questions about the temple on the two
parties. In so doing, the court has created a "locked room mystery" 2 59
that only the two nations can solve: the temple is in Cambodia, but the
surest access from Thailand remains closed; and implementation of
World Heritage Site plans is moving slowly, indicating that investment
of resources from both nations could help accelerate the process.
Therefore, the maintenance and preservation of the site for future
generations requires the cooperation of the parties.
Though the temple's symbolic meaning will likely remain
intense for some in both Thailand and Cambodia, political manipulation
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has distorted this symbolism, and has proven an obstacle to decisionmaking about the site's preservation. Exploration of the question as
purely a border dispute, rather than as a complex problem of shared
cultural heritage, led to calls for an adjudicative solution, which
ultimately proved unsatisfactory to all parties, and should not be
repeated. If both countries focus on decisions about productive
management of the site, absent heated political rhetoric, a cooperative
dialog may emerge.
Third party actors, such as ASEAN, could play a constructive
role in this process, though the regional body's dispute resolution
mechanisms may still be too undeveloped to be truly determinative.
Further, successful management of other conflicts between the two
nations, such as the dispute involving energy reserves in the Gulf of
Thailand, could build the foundation of trust and cooperation needed to
revisit the Preah Vihear question. Bilateral negotiation utilizing an
interest-based framework probably stands the best chance of forging a
long-range solution encompassing commitment to the preservation and
peaceful use of the site and its extraordinary surroundings. But this can
only happen if both sides make changes.
Thailand .must control its corrosive domestic politics by
strengthening parties, reducing corruption and committing to a
framework of free and fair elections affording space for minority views
within its society. Likewise, the growth of diverse political parties in
Cambodia can challenge the strongman rule which has made bilateral
cooperation difficult. Further, in order to build trust with their Thai
counterparts, Cambodia must firmly commit to bilateral negotiation
without the implied fallback of international adjudication. Only then
will the mature relationship necessary to reflect each nation's sovereign
strength, as well as its ability to function effectively on the 21st Century
international stage, be established.
Like warring parents in a divorce who have lost sight of the
child's best interest, Thailand and Cambodia must return their focus to
what is in the best, long-term interest for Preah Vihear, and future
generations which will benefit from its preservation. The ICOMOS
report describing the first gopura (gateway tower), the initial tiered
pavement leading to the temple's spectacular view, provides a clue to
this necessary cooperation: "Two paths join here - one from Thailand,
by means of the monumental stairway, and one from the Cambodian
plain, by means of the rock-cut eastern stairway." 260 Parallel to the
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ancient site's basic construction, only input from each side can ensure
the temple's future.
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